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The ‘discipline’ of post-academic science: Reconstructing the 
paradigmatic foundations of a virtual research institute 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper asks whether post-academic science, alternatively referred to as Mode 2 or 
Triple Helix, can be given disciplinary foundations in spite of its often-displayed 
organizational diversity, relevance orientation and transdisciplinarity. It answers the 
question in the affirmative, after having first reviewed and criticized a number of 
traditional concepts of disciplinarity and disciplinary emergence, established a new 
basis for conducting a paradigm analysis of fragmented, soft and user oriented fields 
of inquiry, and finally reviewed a case institute where this type of research has been 
sustained for over 10 years in a virtual setting (geographically distributed without a 
‘home base’). The argument of the paper is that the concept of post-academic 
disciplinarity may be reconstructed as the guiding principles of hybrid research 
collective’s historical and institutional context, where a ‘hard core’ of reflexive 
communicative inclusiveness pertains vis-à-vis certain issues, instrumentalities and 
practitioner constellations. 
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Introduction 
The received notion of ‘discipline’ is often understood to refer to an area of 
instruction or expertise. In this sense the concept has been said to pertain to the 
‘disciplining’ of students by the profession of academic instruction (Guntau and 
Laitko, 1991), to be a ‘unified’, ‘autonomous’ corpus of knowledge (Silliman, 1974), 
and to be a place of social association where academics shape a homogenous 
professional identity (Geiger, 1986). The concept of post-academic science (Ziman, 
1994; 2000) or Mode 2 (Gibbons, et al., 1994) as it has been popularly referred to, 
challenges these notions with implications pertaining to a broadening of the 
legitimate sphere of academic involvement in terms of ‘relevance driven’ forms of 
knowledge production, as well as an insight that even the most ‘basic’ of research 
problems are essentially transdisciplinary and socially boundary spanning. By 
extension, the old ‘carving of nature at the joints’ is increasingly seen as a limited 
vision for guiding research organizations even towards more traditional goals of 
knowledge creation. Yet instead of losing itself in reactive instrumentality, research 
under the post-academic heading seems to develop a responsiveness to social and 
existential dimensions of human life, and to display an increasingly collectivised 
inclusiveness of a variety of perspectives and disciplinary outlooks (Hellstrom and 
Jacob, 2000; Ziman, 2000). While ‘disciplinarity’, just like its uncomfortable 
bedfellow ‘paradigm’, in a traditional sense can be said to find its foremost 
expression in guiding researchers towards certain problems, post-academic science 
usually elaborates its problems in an extended context of relevance, sometimes 
referred to as ‘context of application’ (Ziman, 2000; Gibbons, et al., 1994) and 
sometimes to ‘extended peer community’ (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993). It thus 
carries within it almost the negation of disciplinarity as we are commonly used to 
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define the term (e.g. a ‘hard-core’ of interrelated common concepts and questions that 
guide problem choice together with a corresponding social organization).  
 Yet, while academia often welcomes interdisciplinarity on a rhetorical level, 
the actual trend, at least in many of the ‘harder’ sciences, is in the opposite direction 
with increasing specialization, diversification and fragmentation (Fuller, 1993). This 
trend risks creating a rift between basic, yet very fragmented specializations and more 
pluralistic, transdisciplinary contexts of knowledge creation: a development which in 
the end may hamper a meaningful and creative policy driven advancement of 
academe towards a more democratised state (Fuller, 1997). The apparent lack of a 
post-academic discipline amenable to traditional academic meta-standards seems to 
be a source of worry among proponents of traditional forms of research (Evans, 
1999). Commentators on so-called Mode 2 knowledge production have for example 
focused on the problem that it does not seem to recognize enough the need for a 
formalized and internally received justification phase in academic knowledge creation 
(Weingart, 1997). Here the conception is that justification of knowledge is connected 
to disciplinary institutions such as departments and journals, and that it is only 
through these institutions that the knowledge is truly validated. 
The problem with this critique is that it is based on a naïve “truth as 
correspondence with nature” understanding of the product of academically produced 
knowledge, and further on an idealistic conception of the political economy of 
science. This correspondence and presentationist understanding is problematic from a 
socialized perspective because as it presupposes a conception of nature prior to and 
disconnected from the knowledge that is to be tested about it, e.g. it takes for granted 
that knowledge is tested through replication – while it is not (Collins, 1985). The 
understanding of the political economy of science is naïve because it assumes that it 
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progresses without any concern for the cost incurred, or that knowledge growth 
displays an ‘increasing returns’ logic in the social structure of academe (Fuller, 2002).  
Acknowledging these reflexive imperatives, we are able to observe that the 
more research that is actually conducted in post-academic settings the more apparent 
it becomes that there is a ‘discipline’ to post-academic science, however not in the 
way we are used to the term. This paper is about reconstructing the notion of 
academic discipline within the framework of post-academic science, and to do this 
through a paradigm analysis of one of its typical organizational forms, an application 
oriented, virtual research institute oriented towards management and policy 
stakeholders. The paper will proceed by reviewing a number of conceptions of 
discipline found in the academic literature, and taking these often conflicting notions 
as points of departure elaborate a starting point for analysing the paradigmatic 
foundations for post-academic discipline. This emerging framework will then be used 
to break down a number of research projects found in a virtual academic institute, in 
order to empirically illustrate the extensionality of post-academic research discipline. 
Building on this example we will finally propose an outline of a framework, or a 
skeleton key, to understanding the emerging disciplinarity or ‘discipline’ of these 
types of academic collectives. 
 
The concept of ‘discipline’ in a time of disciplinary transgression 
The traditional concept of scientific (or broadly speaking academic) disciplines 
assumes a form of historical development based in the ‘free’ search for knowledge, 
where academic actors have self-organized, as if guided by and invisible hand, to join 
together specific strands of inquiry (e.g. Bush, 1945; Polanyi, 1962). This view of 
discipline formation suggests a ‘servants of nature’ view of the academic, where the 
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discipline is just as much a reflection of natural phenomena as is the rainbow. The 
socio-cultural corollary to this ‘science as nature’ view is of course the Mertonian 
norms of science (Merton, 1973), where the academic machinery is oiled by 
academics natural propensity to subscribe to communism (sharing of knowledge), 
universalism (applying impersonal criteria), disinterestedness (ideological and 
economic detachment) and organized scepticism (mutual and grounded criticism). As 
we go on to refer to the distinction between traditional and relevance driven forms of 
research we need to recognize that many of the concepts co-opted by the proponents 
of academic restructuring clearly deals with types of socio-cognitive action pertinent 
to both traditional as well ‘relevance driven’ academic activity. Some of these 
concepts are: 1) Strategic thinking: Strategy is a concept applicable to national 
science policy, the funding trajectories of research councils and to university 
managers at all levels. On the other hand individual researchers strategize in thinking 
about the future of their research, with regard to their common and aggregate 
interests, their collaboration patterns, and their competition patterns. 2) Innovations: 
New ideas and technologies affect the evolution of science through new 
organisational set-ups, new instrumentation, and new forms of socialisation vis-à-vis 
emerging communities of relevance. These aspects of innovation are just as 
‘disciplinary’ as they are external to traditional scientific discipline. 3) Changes in the 
formal (e.g. the patent laws) and the informal institutions (e.g. culture) affect the 
internal as well as the external conditions for science, and has always done so. 
Just as proponents of Mode 2 tend to emphasize the external context of 
science and disregard the sociality of its internal world, the traditional understanding 
of disciplinary science (autonomous, self-guided, self-organized, etc.) tends to 
relocate science to another reality altogether: to an unearthly and spiritual sphere. 
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Several of the classic concepts in the sociology of science point in this direction: 
Mannheim’s (1976) ‘free-floating intelligentia’, Merton’s (1970) puritanism in 
science, Polanyi’s (1962) ‘republic of science’. They are all the result of 
philosophical abstractions and idealisations or what Popper calls ‘third world 
concepts’ (Popper, 1983). While in these conceptions scientific thinking happens in a 
world consisting of logical propositions and objective empirical facts, a ‘discipline’ in 
the traditional sense represents a further abstraction, namely a reconstruction of the 
historical and situated development of such pure cognition.  
 Disillusionment with the prospects for ‘free science’ and the viability of the 
‘linear model of innovation’ contained therein has led many to formulate alternatives 
to traditional assumptions about the logic of disciplines and discipline formation. 
John Ziman (1994) has suggested that under the new conditions of rapid innovation 
and increasing economic pressure on academe “…science inevitably becomes the 
subject of ‘policy’ debate, as scientists can no longer pull the strings behind the 
scenes and are forced to contend openly with rival interest groups in the public-
expenditure arena (Ziman, 1994, p. 94). In Ziman’s view, disciplinary impetus and 
invisible hands are increasingly subject to customer-contractor relations and social 
needs oriented governance: what he refers to as a state of ‘post-academic science’ 
(Ziman, 1996). One of the most clearly formulated implications of this new state is 
the OECD policy brief for techno-scientific progress that research must cross 
disciplinary, institutional and national borders (OECD, 1999).  
Yet, many researchers involved in both basic and applied research still hold to 
the Mertonian norms of science as a useful ideal (Ernø-Kjølhede, 2001), not least 
because some form of social organization of science qua disciplinary seems to be a 
functional mode of academic governance (Hellström, 2002). One way of beginning to 
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loosen up the Mertonian norms with respect to disciplines is to acknowledge Bruno 
Latour’s distinction between the concept of science and the practice of research, 
where “science is certainty; research is uncertainty. Science is supposed to be cold, 
straight and detached; research is warm, involving and risky.” (Latour, 1998, p. 208). 
This distinction retains the Mertonian norms as a potential regulative system, while 
accepting that science as practice is an action oriented, contextualized human activity 
which may reconstruct its ‘own’ inter-organizationally derived norms in interaction 
with a diversity of actors (Etzkowitz, 1998).  
Ernø-Kjølhede et al. (2001) has explored the distinction between science as a 
socially and epistemically regulative totality, and the organizationally embedded, 
relevance driven science. Against the image of traditional disciplinary development 
of research where the academic is ‘self-organized and self dominated’, they put the 
context dependence of norms, the continuous balancing of individual, societal and 
organizational objectives, and the dual governance of practitioners and peers over the 
formation of academic discourse. By accepting that no researcher is wholly 
‘disciplinary’ or wholly ‘relevance driven’ it is possible to formulate more realistic 
and dynamic concepts of academic discipline for new hybrid forms of knowledge 
production. 
Chubin et al. (1986) explicitly recognize the distinction between ‘science’ and 
‘research’ from a social organization perspective, and point out that what we have 
traditionally taken to be scientific disciplines are now mostly relevant with regard to 
domains of teaching rather than to research. Research is in turn carried out mainly in 
smaller groups or ‘intellectual units’ in between those disciplines where teaching 
takes place (Chubin, et al. 1986). Intermediary to the ‘intellectual units’ and the 
broader, abstract disciplines, we find ‘scientific or intellectual fields’, which represent 
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larger social units of knowledge production and communication. According to 
Whitley (2000), it is in these broader units that academics develop distinct 
competencies and research skills, and these fields “structure the framework in which 
day-to-day decisions, actions and interpretations are carried out by groups of 
scientists” (Whitley, 2000, p. 8-9). This conception suggests a disciplinary corollary 
to Latour’s distinction between science and research, and that when we talk about 
disciplines as a revealed form of academic activity it is Chubin’s intellectual units and 
Whitley’s broader intellectual fields that we a may legitimately speak of.  
The disciplinary content then becomes that which individuals and groups 
bring to the field of academic action; their specific competencies or specialities. John 
Law, in a study of X-Ray Protein Crystallography (1973) has suggested that 
academics tend to develop specialities in either of three areas: (1) technique, methods 
and instrumentation, (2) theory development, and (3) subject matter knowledge. 
Instead of forming a homogenous set of these three specialities intermeshed under a 
‘general disciplinary competence’, academics can modularise themselves into one of 
these areas. Such ‘modularization’ of disciplinary competence makes team formation 
more fluid and the single researcher more able to contribute in a variety of contexts.  
These characteristics may also be derived from Becher’s (1989) typology of 
disciplines, where hard and pure disciplines, which are inward looking, academically 
cohesive, and concerned with the discovery of universals, are contrasted with soft and 
applied disciplines which are concerned with particulars, have a familiar everyday 
language of discourse, and a pluralistic approach to quality and disputes. A somewhat 
more sophisticated way of formulating the formative dimensions of disciplines along 
these contextual lines is found in Whitley (2000), who describe disciplines as being 
located along two intersecting axes of task uncertainty (high and low) and mutual 
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dependence (high and low). Task uncertainty refers to the possible range of 
interpretation a discipline can legitimately display for a given problem, and in 
extension the degree of certainty with which a problem is defined as such in the first 
place. Similarly, mutual dependence refer to the organizational aspects of a research 
collective; whether a researcher can conduct his/her research relatively autonomous 
from colleagues, or whether he/she must operate with the physical backing of an 
organization of some kind. Whitley suggests that high mutual dependence and low 
task uncertainty is found in the ‘mature’ natural sciences like physics and chemistry, 
while low mutual dependence and high task uncertainty is more indicative of, for 
instance, business administration and other ‘hybrid research collectives’ (Whitley, 
2000). It is clear that that a working concept of disciplinarity, in order to be useful for 
post-academic science such as it has been described above, must involve formative 
social and epistemic processes that has traditionally been separated by strict 
community boundaries, and even sometimes been considered contradictory. Next we 
will consider a number of ways by which to describe and analyse a research collective 
of the multidisciplinary, hybrid type described above through categories that allow 
these apparent contradictions to be resolved. To this end a framework for ‘paradigm 
analysis’ will be presented and then employed to outline and analyse the profile of a 
typical post-academic research organization. 
 
Reconstructing discipline through paradigm analysis 
The most common conception of scientific paradigms comes from Thomas Kuhn’s 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962/1969). Without going too deeply into 
his specific arguments, one may still note that Kuhn’s concept offers little help in 
unfolding the disciplinary conditions of fragmented post-academic science. In a broad 
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sense, the Kuhnian paradigm refers to a ‘disciplinary matrix’ of beliefs, values and 
techniques shared by a research collective, to which its members often unreflexively 
subscribe. In the more narrow sense a paradigm is an ‘exemplar’, or an influential 
presentation of a scientific theory. One may reflect that Kuhn’s paradigm concept is 
either too unspecific to function as an analytical tool in its own right, or so specific 
and discriminatory that it leaves nothing to analyse in the first place (Shapere, 1964). 
One may also reflect that when seen as a concrete regulative for choices made in 
science, the Kuhnian paradigm concept paints a picture of academic work more in 
line with Latour’s (1998) ideal ‘Science’ than with active and socialized ‘research’, in 
the sense that an ‘abstract’ system is allowed to determine a ‘material’ one. 
 Still, the Kuhnian paradigm concept gives us some indication of where to look 
when attempting to describe academic fields. In the Postscript to ‘Structure’, Kuhn 
suggests that historical-sociological analysis can reveal how exemplars and 
disciplinary matrices are constructed. He consequently suggests that social 
researchers should study, for instance, conference attendance, journal reading 
patterns, articles published and cited, and on the basis of this data identify 
‘communities of practitioners’ (Kuhn, 1969). The researcher should then study the 
behaviour of these communities to see what commitments they share. Larry Laudan 
(1977) criticized Kuhn along the same lines as Shapere (1964) and others, and 
considered the paradigm concept difficult to use to make sense of the historical record 
of scientific change. He instead advocated a view of paradigms as being made up of 
essentially three different levels of commitment (Laudan, 1984): (1) to a particular 
ontology (significant components of the world represented as theoretical entities), (2) 
to a theoretical framework (the assumptions about how things are to be explained in a 
specific field), and (3) a set of methodological commitments (ways of collecting 
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data). He suggested that while any paradigm carries within it all three types of 
commitment, they in turn exhibit a relative autonomy vis-à-vis each other. If a 
research tradition makes substantial changes in its ontological components (say it 
adds theoretical entities), method can lag for a while, however eventually method and 
theory have to follow a changing ontology. 
Differentiating of the paradigm concept in this way by removing its 
‘monolithic’ assumptions, helps in the analysis of more complex academic traditions, 
e.g where ontologies, theoretical developments and changes in methodology 
corresponds differentially to various interests which are themselves changing over 
time. Törnebohm, went a step further in the direction of differentiating the paradigm 
concept and making it amenable to empirical analysis (e.g. Törnebohm, 1983; 1985).  
Extending Kuhn’s original concept in a number of studies, he suggests four broad 
paradigm components:  
(1) Interests: What the researcher wants to do.  
(2) Competencies: What he/she can do. 
(3) Worldview: The general assumptions about reality that the researcher makes. 
(4) Scientific outlook: Assumptions about the academic field, what it should be 
involved in, its relation to other fields, its strategies, and the complex of tasks that the 
researcher may engage in. This broad category also includes two sub-components: 
(4.1) a methodological commitment (how the researcher should apply data collecting 
and transforming technologies general sense), and (4.2) a research ideal (more or less 
explicit desiderata for how the researcher wants the field to develop. In this view, an 
academic tradition or a research collective may be characterised by the interests, 
competencies, worldviews and scientific outlooks that a collective of researchers have 
in common (Törnebohm, 1985). 
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 Socialized paradigm analysis 
The above examination makes it clear that we have to further extend our 
understanding of the paradigm concept for it to be an effective aid in disciplinary 
reconstruction. Especially, we need to implode the distinctions inherent in previous 
concepts between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ drivers of disciplinarity, e.g. implicit 
distinctions between cognitive and social factors, between pure and applied, 
knowledge and value, and between science and society. Concepts going beyond these 
dichotomies are for instance Galison’s (1997) ‘trading zone’, Nowotny et al.’s (2001) 
concept of strong, middle and weak contextualisation, as well as Latour’s (1991) 
actants.  
These concepts allows us to address the paradigm-discipline as a hybrid nexus 
for the production of knowledge, value and sociality, or as a ‘knowledge-value-
network’ encompassing a learning component which ties to the social as well as the 
goal driven and cognitive aspect of academic endeavour. In knowledge-value-
networks knowledge and value are not seen as distinct, but as two different sides of 
the same phenomena. Knowledge is potential value and value is actualised 
knowledge. 
From this follows some important and radical shifts in the understanding of 
disciplinarity. For example we shift to a pragmatic or value based understanding of 
knowledge and sociality (e.g. Rorty, 1983). This non-representational understanding 
sees knowledge as created through trustful actions based on risky expectations of the 
future. The process of discipline development is based on learning in the knowledge-
value-networks, especially when new boundaries are created and transgressed. 
Constructing boundaries in social reality make learning possible because it produces a 
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new outside environment that the actor – through transgression - can gain new 
knowledge about. With this more complex picture of knowledge-value-networks in 
mind we may proceed to attempt a disciplinary reconstruction of a specific post-
academic research institute. To this end we have applied the broader insights of the 
knowledge-value conception elaborated above together with the analytical categories 
suggested by Törnebohm’s (1985) paradigm concept. Because of the level of 
analytical detail and broadness in scope this concept appears to be especially well 
suited to grasp the disciplinary complexity of post-academic research. In what follows 
this concept will be applied to reconstruct a disciplinary identity for a post-academic 
research collective, that neither falls back on the highly simplified and rationalized 
disciplinary image of ‘normal science’, nor end up simply being a litany of disparate 
items of ‘user relevance’ without any critical academic core. 
 
The present study 
The empirical focus for this analysis is a virtual research institute (Institute for 
Management of Innovation and Technology – IMIT) located physically at three of 
Sweden’s largest universities, but encompassing researchers from all over Sweden 
including Finland and Denmark. The institute engages in cooperative projects with 
industry and public bodies, in the area of technology and innovation management. It 
is completely dependent on external funding for its existence, and has grown into 
filling a dual role for its members, as an administrative vehicle for managing projects 
as well as an intellectual community of practice. The goal of the study was to 
ascertain whether a paradigmatic foundation or emerging ‘discipline’ could be 
reconstructed for the institute. In order to do this the authors analysed 10 years of 
abstracts for research project conducted at the institute, and thereby applied 
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Törnebohm’s paradigm concept as an analytical prism. The picture that emerged from 
this analysis is presented below. 
 
The case organization 
Each of the paradigm components of interests, worldview, scientific outlook and 
methodological commitments will be represented by 10 positions taken, or foci 
adopted, in a ‘typical’ IMIT project. These have been derived from of a project 
descriptions spanning 10 years, and may be said to be representative of this material 
by dint of abstracting out specific characteristic notions and approaches than run 
through most of the projects. The competencies component has been omitted in this 
analysis, because of the difficulty of assessing competence profiles on the basis of the 
project descriptions. However, a reading of the faculty description of IMITs annual 
faculty catalogue reveals that there is a broad mix of social scientists and engineers 
represented, with an emphasis on industrial engineering, management and work 
psychology/sociology. Also, methodological commitment has been abstracted out 
from scientific outlook, since it forms its own coherent descriptive category in the 
empirical material. 
 
Interests 
This paradigmatic category was represented by the following characteristic research 
foci (or ‘research interests’): 
 
• Understanding and improving change processes in the product development 
organization of a manufacturing company. 
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• Describing key limitations of construction and production processes in a whole 
business sector. 
• Better understanding ‘puzzling’ social and technological processes that hamper 
organizational innovations processes. 
• Design new organizational forms for learning between organizations. 
• Deepen the understanding of how work organization, competencies and salary 
systems affect business development in a manufacturing company. Create 
contacts for future cooperation between company, union and academe. 
• Map the competence development strategies of foreign (Italian) small enterprises, 
and pinpoint corresponding regional support systems. 
• Assess the effects of the geographical distribution of an organization on the work 
patterns of its members, especially the way that distance work affects professional 
work groups and leaders. 
• Understand the consequences of merging different product development 
paradigms, for instance when hardware and software are to be integrated in the 
design of new cars. 
• Identify key aspects of the co-evolution of knowledge creation, renewal and long 
term growth in young medium sized technology based companies. 
• Appreciate in a number of cases whether management consulting actually 
contribute to learning and regeneration in organizations. 
 
Appraisal: The interest component reveals an emphasis on understanding the 
dynamics of various organizational change processes. This understanding is 
influenced by problematic developments in the ‘research object’ and its environment. 
The research focus retains an emphasis on ‘basic’ social and technological processes, 
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but is at the same time strongly guided by values. These values pertain to a problem 
solving interests that sometimes emphasizes corporate ‘growth’ and, sometimes 
political (e.g. regional) and/or human interests (e.g. work place improvements, unions 
etc.). There are also examples of more critical research interests (e.g. the study of 
management consulting). 
 
Worldview 
This paradigmatic category was represented by the following characteristic 
perceptions of core features of the researched reality: 
 
• Increasing tension between individual/human and managerial/organizational 
systems implies new demands on leadership. 
• The external context of many organizations is increasingly high paced, which 
creates dissonance between internal abilities and external demands. 
• Actors in programmed environments (e.g. in project organizations) respond ‘ad 
hoc’ to external demands, and the system thereby loses important learning effects. 
• New external demands on companies create certain paradoxical dilemmas in the 
innovation process, for instance developments in regulation are sometimes more 
complex than technological innovation. 
• A broadening of employee competence and the integration of work processes lead 
to a decline of the boarders between union and corporation. 
• Regional networks of small and medium sized companies spontaneously develop 
beneficial competence support systems (that may be studied and generalized). 
• Telecommunication solutions create new geographical patterns of corporate 
distribution, which correspond to changing, ‘virtualized’ work practices. 
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• There is a fundamental difference in the ‘logic’ of certain forms of product 
development, and these logics are increasingly collapsed in industry. 
• There is a potential conflict between work specialization and generalization, 
which is in turn connected to the relationship between innovation and efficiency.   
• When line managers are laid off, the responsibility for renewal and knowledge 
creation is (problematically) transferred to management consultants. 
 
Appraisal: The basic assumptions about the researched world concern to the 
pervasiveness of environmental complexity, the challenging of human made systems 
boundaries (e.g. between a company and its various contexts) and the boundedness of 
the rationality of actors involved. This worldview typically involves an appreciation 
of multiple causalities, very dynamic interaction patterns and many interacting levels 
of reduction (e.g. between individuals, management systems and regions). 
Management is often seen as an activity ‘on the boundaries’ between different 
systems and rationalities. As several such systems or ‘logics’ are collapsed, 
management is challenged to confront social and epistemological paradoxes, and to 
create beneficial synergies out of these encounters. 
 
Scientific outlook 
This paradigmatic category is represented by the following examples of scientific 
outlook or of imperative notions as to what inquiry should focus on: 
 
• Create knowledge about dynamic organizational processes for the purpose of 
facilitating intervention and change. 
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• Represent complex development patterns in such a way that many stakeholders in 
the organization can use these representations. 
• Create organizational forms and concrete points of reference for knowledge 
sharing. 
• Produce knowledge about the state of affairs in different branches of business 
through comparative analysis. 
• Capture international best practice and transfer ‘actionable knowledge’ to 
decision makers involved in human resource management.  
• Capture the effects on organizations of a ‘spontaneous’ societal development (e.g. 
convergence in telecommunications). 
• Create an understanding of how different merging ‘development logics’ affects 
cooperation in projects. 
• Improve the possibilities for commercial effectiveness through knowledge of a 
pervasive social dynamic in technology and knowledge creation. 
• Critical analysis of knowledge creation and rhetoric in a service sector.  
 
Appraisal: With regard to scientific outlook, there is a preference for research to focus 
on local effects of larger societal processes, often in the form of impact studies. 
Notions of local and global utility affect the research focus, but not necessarily or 
even preferably in the sense of ‘profit maximization’, although the creation of some 
form of value often takes precedence in focusing the research effort. Research in this 
regard is actor oriented (individuals, groups, organizations, policy makers), and the 
focus is on understanding for the purpose of improving the conditions for one or 
several of these actors. Research is thus directed at issues that make sense from a 
certain actor’s point of view, and it is typically oriented towards critical knowledge 
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transfer, rather than interventionist (e.g. researcher acting as practitioner). In this 
sense the scientific outlook often combines an instrumental and a critical-
communicative perspective with that of understanding. 
 
Methodological commitments 
This paradigmatic category was represented by the following examples of 
methodological commitments, i.e. how one should work practically with the research 
questions: 
 
• Multiple case studies of key processes in companies of a particular branch. 
Emphasis on detailed, thick descriptions. 
• A combination of interviews, questionnaires and model construction. 
• Strongly selective, illustrative case studies. 
• Organization building. Quasi-experimental approach. 
• Comparative case studies of one business sector in two different countries. 
• Empirical survey through selective interviews (convenience/relevance sampling) 
of business people and policy makers on the question of a proposed intervention. 
• Multiple, comparative case studies combined with a broad questionnaire survey of 
different companies (variation in business area and size) with regard to one 
particular issue. 
• Participant observation and ‘trailing’ or following around of key actors. Repeated 
deep interviews. 
• Focus group discussions combined with simulation of a hypothetical case in a 
group of practitioners. 
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Appraisal: Methodological commitment is towards mixed methodologies and 
triangulation of methods, with a strong emphasis on case studies. Case studies tend 
toward giving prominence to illustrative and communicative criteria, and local 
validity and reflection are important. There is a range of approaches, from the 
traditional questionnaire surveys that satisfy conventional methodological criteria, to 
more experimental, emerging research styles found in ‘softer’ forms of social science 
(e.g. anthropology and organization studies).    
 
The ‘discipline’ of post-academic science: Paradigmatic reflections 
The concept of discipline as a ‘tunnel of inquiry’, where researchers work on a set of 
problems under a fixed framework relatively isolated from other such ‘tunnels’, has 
been shown to be insufficient in numerous studies, even for traditional disciplines 
such as physics and chemistry (e.g. Golinsky, 1998). Instead disciplines are 
increasingly viewed as ever-changing frameworks that organize various forms of 
academic activity, e.g. teaching, inquiry, careers and resource attraction. Disciplines 
are not easily characterized by reference to ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ qualities (Becher, 1998); 
various forms of discourses (critically examining, data gathering, externally focused) 
may proliferate at different phases during the life of a particular research program, 
and it is hard to historically reconstruct any regular stages that such programs ‘must’ 
pass through on their way to ‘mature’ status (Guntau and Laitoko, 1991). In historical 
inquiry these phases rather turn out to be articulated as part of the rhetoric of 
discipline formation qua language game and power struggle.  
In this sense, and as suggested by the above case, the paradigmatic 
foundations for a purposeful and historically persistent academic activity need not be 
preceded by any coherent theoretical framework, language or even package of 
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research practices. Rather it may be viewed as a communal and highly abstracted 
‘thought style’ (Fleck, 1979) of a research collective, who interact within a 
professionally and reflexively derived problem matrix. It is thence not the traded 
down and shared ‘stock of knowledge’ that determine the paradigmatic discipline of a 
research collective such as IMIT’s, but rather an evolving need to address certain 
cognitive and social problems which emerge among a group of professionals, and 
where problem choice itself is guided by a reflexive mix of expedience and academic 
ethos.  
The IMIT case may be instructive in the sense that it actively disengages from 
traditional disciplinarity, yet retains a ‘discipline’ in the sense of academic and 
socially responsive constraint around a number of issues, stakeholders and ways of 
working. IMIT is thence indicative of a particular discipline that leads its members 
towards certain ways of doing research, places to engage in research activity, and of 
speculating. Good (2000) has referred to such ever changing but yet disciplined 
frameworks of inquiry as ‘assemblies’. The case of IMIT may be said to have 
explored a fairly coherent assembly of problems, worldviews, tools, interest groups 
and institutional forms supporting academic action.  
The originality and integrity of this particular assembly cannot be analytically 
delimited in any obvious way. It is nevertheless restricted in practice by the way the 
IMIT research collective act as ‘bricoleurs’ in Levi-Strauss’ sense, i.e. the way that 
they work from “…a set consisting of theoretical and practical knowledge, of 
technical means, which restrict the possible solutions” (Levi-Strauss, 1966, p. 19). 
But it is at the same time clear from the paradigm analysis of IMIT that these 
bricoleurs are also driven by certain ethical/reflexive principles of academic 
engagement. These aspects of the post-academic paradigm are not given even by the 
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most open-ended definition of disciplinarity, but rather concerns ‘discipline’ in the 
sense of what it means to be virtuous as a researcher when a number of stakes outside 
of the purely academic ones are considered.  
As is visible from the analysis, IMIT qua post-academic research institute 
occupies a place in between various interests (academic and practical), scientific 
outlooks (understanding and engaging), worldviews (mechanistic and organic) and 
methodologies (‘soft’ and ‘hard’). Still, it is also clear that IMIT is not ‘everywhere 
and nowhere’, but retains a profile which allows a ‘disciplined’ inclusion and 
exclusion of topics. How does this come about? Going back to our initial account, a 
disciplinary paradigm in the traditional sense may bee seen as a consensual language 
through which problems are formulated in order to receive theoretical significance. 
Problem formulation here is theory-driven (Kuhn, 1969). The discipline of post-
academic science as exemplified by IMIT, instead turns out to be a matrix of 
problems connected to professional conduct in a broad sense, which facilitates 
synchronization and communication among researchers and practitioners. This 
coordination of belief and action resembles what Galison (1997) refers to as a 
“trading zone”; a state where it may be difficult if not impossible to distinguish 
between researchers and practioners, as various forms of theoretical and instrumental 
action interfoliates in non-obvious ways. Post-academic discipline is found in the 
problem generating and problem solving practices which emanate in these trading 
zones. Problems may thus seemingly originate in either academic or practitioner 
discourse, but are more often formulated in a broader community of professional 
practitioners who engage in problem solving of various forms, e.g. managerial 
(business leaders), ethical (politicians, social workers, planners), scientific/theoretical 
(researchers) and communicative (journalists, lobbyists). This community and its 
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specific commitment viz. acceptable conduct and problem orientation must form the 
basis for reconstructing a post-academic disciplinary matrix.  
 
Conclusions 
It would be tempting to suggest that the discipline of post-academic science is about 
successfully negotiating and maintaining the interfaces between forms of knowledges 
and interests, without compromising either the integrity of academic values or the 
integrity of the interests and problems to which these values are expected to 
contribute. However, one may also suggest that post-academic discipline simply 
means that the researcher flexibly adapts the academic framework qua bricoleur, 
while maintaining a non-exclusory communicative ethic with interested parties inside 
and outside of academic discourse. This in turn implies not ‘reducing’ stakeholders to 
research objects, but rather to take them seriously as contributing members in a 
research collective. It also implies being willing to negotiate and re-negotiate the 
borders of this collective. To a post-academic research collective, these features form 
a ‘robust institutional framework’ akin to a discipline in the traditional sense but, as 
argued above, with a more realistic account of the open-ended growth of knowledge, 
self-renewal and social accountability.  
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